


THE MEXICAN POLICY OF SOUTHERN 

LEADERS UNDER BUCHANAN'S 

ADMINISTRATION 



BY 



JAMES MORTON CALLAHAN 



Reprinted from the Annual Report of the American Historical Association 
for 1910, pages 133-151 




WASHINGTON 
1912 



THE MEXICAN POLICY OF SOUTHERN 

LEADERS UNDER BUCHANAN'S 

ADMINISTRATION 



BY 



JAMES MORTON CALLAHAN 



Eeprinted from the Annual Report of the American Historical Association 
for 1910, pages 133-151 






WASHINGTON 
1912 




Iz 



NOV 5 mi 



VIII. THE MEXICAN POLICY OF SOUTHERN LEADERS UNDER 
BUCHANAN'S ADMINISTRATION. 



By JA^IES AIORTON CALLAHAN, 

Professor of nistory , West Virginia University. 



133 



THE MEXICAN POLICY OF SOUTHERN LEADERS UNDER BUCHANAN'S 

ADMINISTRATION. 



By James Morton Callahan. 



The manuscript archives of the Department of State at Washington 
contain the iinpubhshed instructions and chspatches of three promi- 
nent and distinguished men of the South — Gadsden, Forsyth, and 
McLane — who, as envoys extraordinary and ministers plenipotentiary, 
conducted relations A\ith Mexico during the interesting period of 
American liistory in wliich the shibboleth of "manifest destiny" was 
added to the Monroe doctrine of national security. The first of these 
in the Pierce administration acquired territory for a railroad loute to 
the Pacific. The other two, in Buchanan's administration, success- 
ively and unsuccessfully labored to obtain additional territory and 
various privileges which they thought would benefit Mexico as well 
as the United States. 

The Mexican problem, wliich thrice had been adjusted by change 
of boundaries, still persisted after the Gadsden purchase. Compfi- 
cated with southern interests and largely under the influence of 
southern statesmen, the remedy most persistenth' proposed for its 
solution, in connection \vith an American transit route across Mexico, 
was an additional reduction of Mexican territory by a new cession 
to the United States; or, if that should fail, the estabhshment of an 
American protectorate which was expected in time to result in new 
annexations to the stronger country. The problem, only partially 
solved by the Pierce administration, was inlierited by the Buchanan 
administration which continued to negotiate; first, for the acquisition 
of additional Mexican territory and territorial concessions as long 
as there was any hope of success, and later for temtorial concessions 
and direct intervention to enforce treaty stipulations until the seces- 
sion of the Southern States precipitated the beginning of the American 
Civil War and thereby increased the possibility and probability of 
the long-predicted intervention of European powers in Mexico, and 
exposed Mexican territorv* to the possible designs of Confederate 
filibusters. 

In looking for the principal motives which directed the incessant 
and persistent negotiations for more land one finds both sentiment 
and material interests — sentiment against apprehended European 

135 



136 AMEBIC AN HISTORICAL ASSOCIATION. 

intervention in the affairs of Mexico, whose Government needed 
money to pay various claims and debts and to consohdate and 
strengthen itself against internal disorder and foreign designs, and 
the material interests of the "United States as interpreted by its 
Govermnent and prominent southern leaders who were wilHng to pay 
money for a more logical boundary that would reduce the dangers of 
border irritation, and for transit and commercial privileges wliich 
seemed as useful to Mexico as they would be to the United States and 
to the men who had pecuniary interest in them. It was especially 
urged that the annexation of the "isolated and unproductive Prov- 
inces" of Mexico by the United States would "add to the security 
of Mexico." ^ Negotiations were also influenced and complicated by 
conflicting hiterests in Tehuantepec, resulting from the Mexican 
annuUment in 1851 of a transit grant obtained from Santa Anna in 
1842 by a Mexican named Garay, and the later (1853) grant of a 
■ franchise to A. G. Sloo of the Tehuantepec Company, who mortgaged 
it to Falconnet, a British subject, who, in -1856, made a cession of liis 
privilege to Mr. Hargous, of New York, whose right the Mexican 
Government refused to recognize.- 

The Gadsden treaty, obtained by merging a boundary dispute 
into negotiations for boundary alterations, and which secured for 
$10,000,000 the strip of territory south of the Gila, the release of the 
United States from any responsibility for the acts of the Indians 
along the Mexican border, and a guarantee of a right of way across 
the Isthmus of Tehuantepec, was never regarded as a final adjust- 
ment of the territorial question with Mexico. Perhaps it is not 
generally known that the territory obtained was only a small part 
of what was desired at the time. Even before the negotiations were 
completed, at an opportune time in the critical state of Mexican 
affairs, and possibly influenced by the conditions in Sonora and Lower 
California which invited filibustering expeditions,^ the President 
hoped that the Mexican Government, in need of money, might 
make a liberal cession of territory if it could be done without public 
discussion. Accordingly additional "confidential" instructions au- 
thorizing the payment of $50,000,000 for 125,000 square miles of 
territory, including the region beyond the Rio Grande to the water- 
shed and to 32° on the Gulf of California, were sent to Gadsden by 
special messenger, Mr. C. L. Ward, who was directed not to carry 
his written instructions into Mexico.* The attempt to secure so large 

121 Despatches, Mexico (i. e., Department of State, Bureau of Indexes and Archives, Diplomatic 
Archives, Mexico, Despatches from American agents, vol. 21) No. 72, Apr. 3, 18.5S,and No. 73, Apr. 16, 1858. 

> 17 Instructions, Mexico (i. e., Department of State, etc., Mexico, Instructions to American Agents, vol. 
17), July 17, 1857. 

» 14 Despatches, Mexico, No. 3, Mar. 8, 1850; No. 7, Dec. 24, 1S52; and Nos. 40 and 41 of May 19 and 24, 
1853; New York Herald, July 27, 1854. 

* Secret Book 2, No. 20, Jan. 6, 1854; Department of State, Diplomatic Archives, Special Missions, 
vol. 3, p. 38, Oct. 22, and also p. 277. 



MEXICAN POLICY UNDER BUCHANAN. 137 

an extent of territory probably excited the suspicions of Mexico and 
delayed the completion of the treaty. 

Aware of the danger of arousing further the anticession sentiment 
of Mexico, which had led to the expulsion of Santa Anna, and possibly 
influenced by the recent failures to secure Cuba and Hawaii, the 
Pierce administration hesitated to propose negotiations for more 
Mexican territory. After the negotiation of the Gadsden treaty, 
however, there were various sources of friction and irritation which, 
while they threatened to arrest the progress of American expansion 
in the southwest, also encouraged expectations of new territorial 
cessions to which no Mexican Government could ever have been 
induced to agree after the troubled experience of Santa Anna. Seeing 
no chance to effect an arrangement involving a pecuniary liquidation 
of claims, Gadsden wrote to Marcy in the spring of 1855 that, "if 
property, extension of territory, or other grants or commercial privi- 
leges are not acceptable as a means of settlement, resort must be had 
to the sword, which will end in the absorption of the whole Kepublic."^ 
In his valedictory dispatch, complaining that his dispatches had 
been treated with indifference and attributing his recall to the energy 
^vith which he had watched and reported European designs which 
threatened to check the progress of America by the formation of an 
alliance of Spanish America against the United States, he exonerated 
himself from all responsibility for the impending loss of Mexico, Cuba, 
and the Gulf.^ 

Three months before Gadsden left his post, John Forsyth, of Ala- 
bama, received his commission as envoy to Mexico, with instructions 
to allay all suspicion that the United States had sinister designs on 
Mexico, but to urge trade reciprocit}^ , a postal convention, and fair 
indemnities to adjust American claims.^ After viewing the con- 
ditions, he reported that there was little hope of stability for Mexico 
except through a proposed alliance ^\dth the United States by the 
infusion of Americans into the Mexican Army.* On February 10, 
1857, he negotiated treaties which he thought would strengthen 
the ^Mexican Government, and which also would have made important 
changes in the internal relations of the two nations. One, providing 
for a loan b}' the United States to Mexico and for the payment of the 
British convention debt, was not authorized by instructions. With 
this were combined a postal convention, a reciprocit}' treaty, and 
commercial arrangements to open Mexican markets to American 
manufactures. The President had weighty objections to some of 
these treaties and decided not to submit them to the Senate so near 
the close of his administration.^ 

» 19 Despatches, Mexico, No. CO, Apr. 3, 1855. 

> 19 Despatches, Mexico, No. 97, Oct. 4, 1856. 

» 17 Instructions, Mexico, No. 2, Aug. 10, 1856. 

* 29 Despatches, Mexico, No. 5, Nov. 8; No. 14, Dec. 19, 1856. 

» 17 Instructions, Mexico, No. 11, Mar. 3; No. 12, Mar. 11, 1857. 



138 AMERICAN HISTORICAL ASSOCIATION. 

The Buchanan administration, largeh^ under the influence of 
Senator Judah P. Benjamin, who was the attorney for the new Louis- 
iana Tehuantepec Co., resumed negotiations for territory. In July, 
1857, two months before the time set for the termination of the 
extraordinary power of President Comonfort, of Mexico, the Presi- 
dent sent to Forsyth new instructions — which were handed to him 
by Emile La Sere, president of the Louisiana Tehuantepec Co., who 
went to Mexico with Benjamin to secure a modification of the Sloo 
grant. These authorized him to conclude a treaty ^\ath Mexico 
for the acquisition of Lower CaUfornia, nearly all of Sonora, and 
part of Chihuahua north of 30°, and the right of way or transit in 
perpetuity, under American guarantee of neutrality, on any route 
of commerce which should be constructed across Mexico from ocean 
to ocean. He was authorized to pay four or five miUion dollars for 
Lower California and eight or ten million for the Sonora and Chi- 
huahua territory. At the same time he was instructed to aid Ben- 
jamin and La Sere, and was authorized, if expedient, to employ 
their services in obtaining the cession of territory.^ 

Forsyth, whose previous dispatches had reported the impractica- 
bility of any attempt to negotiate a new boundary treaty with a 
Government which had strongly pledged itself not to alienate, cede, 
exchange, or hypothecate any part of the national territory, hesi- 
tated to undertake negotiations which contemplated the acquisition 
of so much territory at a price far below the exaggerated Mexican 
estimates of its value, and which offered no pecuniary compensation 
or equivalent for the franchises gi^^ng privileges of right of way 
across Tehuantepec in extension of the concessions of 1853. ^ Although 
he considered that any attempt to negotiate was hopeless from the 
beginning, he approached both the president and Lerdo de Tejada 
who declined to consider the subject. ISIean while, he had dechned 
to cooperate with Benjamin and La Sere, known in capital papers 
as the "American negotiators," whose presence he felt had tended 
to degrade the legation and who on September 7 concluded a private 
contract with Mexico to which Forsyth objected on the gromid that 
it annulled the Sloo grant, put in jeopardy all American interests 
on the isthmus, gave the United States no benefit, and was not in 
conformity with the terms and conditions of Cass's instructions. 
He especially resented the pretentions of Benjamin, who he felt 
had been largely responsible for the failure of his treaties of Feb- 
ruary 10, who boasted that he carried the Buchanan administra- 
tion in his pocket, and whose Mexican acquaintances — of the banking 
and capitalistic class — openly remarked that he had secret and 

1 17 Instructions, Mexico, No. 27 and No. 28, July 17, 1857. 
8 21 Despatches, Mexico, No. 48, Sept. 15, 1857. 



MEXICAN POLICY UNDER BUCHANAN. 139 

ample powers which placed the United States legation in temporary 
abeyance.^ 

On their return to the United States, the smooth Benjamin and 
La Sere, in a note to President Buchanan, attacked Forsyth's 
integrity and honor as a gentleman, blaming him for his course 
regarding their transit negotiations which had caused them to lose 
a million dollars, and accusing him of favoring the cause of Soule, 
the representative of the Sloo interests, who was in Mexico City at 
the same time to oppose the plans of Benjamin and La Sere. The 
inquisitive and dominating Benjamin evidently had kept a diary in 
which he had made full notes of all Forsyth's daily life and actions.^ 

The irate Forsyth in his defense said liis instructions had not 
required him to subordinate to the interests of a company seeking 
lucrative railway privileges any of the public questions involved in 
his negotiations — including the proposition to transfer the sover- 
eignty of an empire. At the same time he declared that by nego- 
tiations not complicated with attempts to get territory he could 
have obtained a satisfactory treaty which w^ould have secured to 
the United States the virtual protectorate and military occupation 
of the Tehuantepec transit and a cession of a right of way for a rail- 
road across the northern part of Mexico, almost on the Hne which 
the Buchanan administration had proposed as a new boundary, 
together mtli grants of alternate leagues of land which, in addition 
to use as a fund for the construction of the road, "would have fenced 
off and consecrated to American use and ultimately to American 
ownership the very territory" which he had been instructed to 
purchase.^ He desired authority to open negotiations for a treaty 
of transits and commerce on this basis for which he proposed to pay 
S12,000,000; but his Government declined to contribute money to 
relieve Mexico ''unless it could get a consideration equally valuable 
in return."* Forsyth explained that he had been "anxious to 
make it clear that the purchase of commercial privileges was con- 
templated, and in fact desired, merely as a means to a political 
end — that end being to sustain Mexico and to keep her from falhng 
to pieces, perhaps into the hands of foreign powers, until such time 
as we were ready to 'Americanize' her."^ 

Later wliile sustaining the dechning Comonfort government by 
efforts to induce bankers to lend money to it and contemplating 
"some decisive step to meet the exigency of the situation," he earn- 
estly requested authority at a critical moment to offer for territory 
a much larger price, which might prove an irresistible temptation to 

1 21 Despatches, Mexico, Private, Jan. 14, 1858. 

s 21 Despatches, Mexico, No. 57, Nov. 24, 1857. 

» 21 Despatches, Mexico, No. 52, Sept. 29; No. 51, Sept. 26, 1857. 

< 17 Instructions, Mexico, No. 3.3, Nov. 17, 1857. 

' 21 Despatches, Mexico, No. 68, Feb. 13, 1858. 



140 AMEEICAISr HISTORICAL ASSOCIATIOIsr. 

President Comonfort and the Mexican Congress and satisfy the expec- 
tation of the public mind; but he was informed that the maximum 
price already olTered could not be extended. Still later, confident 
that he had had an opportunity to make a treaty if he could have 
made an immediate advance of $500,000 in cash, he urged that 
$1,500,000 should be placed at his disposal to be apphed as part 
payment immediately on signing the cession at the next favorable 
opportunity.^ 

At the fall of the Comonfort government he immediately felt the 
territorial pulse of the Zuloaga administration and reported that the 
symptoms were favorable.^ Encouraged by the reports of his eccle- 
siastical agents who had sounded both Zuloaga and minister Cuevas, 
he formally on March 22, 1858, proposed negotiations for a change 
of boundary and for transits. On the proposition for cession of ter- 
ritory, liis argument was the doctrine of "manifest destiny" sup- 
ported by the inevitable, unchangeable, and inscrutable laws of the 
Creator. Cuevas poHtely dechned and clearly stated his reasons.^ 
Attributing the rejection to timidity and "a paroxysm of poHtical 
cowardice" Forsyth withdrew liis proposition by a brief note stating 
that the generosity of the United States would be vindicated in the 
fullness of time, and emerged from the brief diplomatic contest with 
the firm conviction that Mexico needed another government.* Deplor- 
ing the lack of American foreign poHcy since the Mexican war, he 
urged that the plain and obvious duty of the United States was to 
resort to the argument of compulsion to induce Mexico to meet her 
obhgations, and incidentally to enable the United States to secure ter- 
ritory. "You want Sonora ?" said he. "The American blood spilled 
near its Hne would justify you in seizing it. * * * You want 
other territory? Send me power to make an ultimate demand for 
the several milHons Mexico owes our people. * * * You want 
the'Tehuantepec transits? Say to Mexico, 'Nature has placed that 
shortest highway between the two oceans, so necessary to the com- 
merce of the world. * * * Give us what we ask for in return for 
the manifest benefits we propose to confer on you for it, or we "u-ill 
take it.' " Such language he said would result in good to both 
countries.^ 

Considering the possible decision of the American Government to 
accept a protectorate for Mexico, he urged that the selection of a 
worthy head of the new Mexican Government should be an essential 
condition. He doubted the wisdom of selecting Juarez and he pro- 

1 21 Despatches, Mexico, No. 56, Nov. 18; No. 58, Nov. 25; No. 62, Dee. 17, 1857; Private, Jan. 14, 1858. 

2 21 Despatches, Mexico, No. 66, Jan. 29; No. 67, Jan. 30; No. 68, Feb. 13; No. 69, Mar. 1; No. 71, Mar. 
18, 1858. 

3 21 Despatches, Mexico, No. 72, Apr. 3, 1858; Diario de Avisos, Apr. 29, 1859. 
* 21 Despatches, Mexico, No. 73, Apr. 8, 1858. 

' 21 Despatches, Mexico, Private, Apr. 15, 1858. 



MEXICAN POLICY UNDER BUCHANAN. 141 

posed to eliminate Comonfort. He especially commended the clever 
]Miguel Lerdo de Tejada, who had lost all hope in his country and was 
thoroiiglily converted to the "doctrine that an American protectorate 
was the only recourse." He also favorably mentioned Osollo, to 
whom he suggested a conference with Lerdo, whom he regarded as 
the real Liberal leader. "If these two men choose," said he, "I 
beheve they will have the power to change the Government in 24 
hours." ^ 

As the fury^ of civil war increased, he ruffled the composure of the 
palace by presenting cases for consideration and by the belKgerent 
stand wliich he took in protesting against forced loans and contribu- 
tions, to which he advised foreigners not to yield unless confronted 
by armed force. He was finally summoned to a private interview by 
Zuloaga, who stated that as a last resort he had decided to make the 
sacrifice of territory for the good of liis country^ and for his own 
salvation, but the rising hopes thus produced were suddenly lowered 
again by the vacillation of Zuloaga two days later.^ 

Assured that the Buchanan administration was satisfied with the 
manner in which he had performed his negotiations,^ and receiving 
no further special instructions during the remainder of his stay, 
Forsyth assumed an attitude of active opposition to the Zuloaga 
Government — and especially of antagonism to Cuevas, who had, he 
learned, requested his recall. He confidently reported that the 
Government would either be overtlu-own or forced to negotiate with 
him a treaty of cession. At the close of an undignified and undiplo- 
lomatic correspondence in June, he suspended diplomatic relations 
until he could learn the pleasure of his Government.^ While awaiting 
a reply from Washington he kept in close touch with the enemies of 
the Zuloaga Government and informed his o^^^l Government that he 
saw the signs and preparations of an almost matured revolution 
under the leadership of Lerdo, who, after several recent changes of 
domicile to avoid arrest, had become a guest under the roof of the 
American legation, and had confided liis plans to the American 
minister. Learning that the Mexican authorities had discovered 
Lerdo's retreat and might attempt to take him by force, he prepared 
arms and ammunition and 30 Americans to defend his "castle."^ 
In August, when he received instructions sanctioning his suspension 
of relations and directing liim to take the steamer which had been 
sent to Vera Cruz to carry him home, he rephed that his private 
interests would not permit such precipitate haste, and remained two 

1 21 Despatches, Mexico, Private, Apr. 15, 1858. 
« 22 Despatches, Mexico, No. 77, June 1; No. 78, June 17, 1858. 
3 17 Instructions, Mexico, No. 46, May 19, 1858. 

* 22 Despatches, Mexico, No. 79, June 19; No. 80, June 25. Forsyth reported that M. de Gabriac, the 
French Minister to Mexico, was at the bottom of a movement against the Americao legatiOD. 
^ 22 Despatches, Mexico, No. 81, July 1, 1858. 



142 AMEEICAN HISTORICAL ASSOCIATION-. 

months longer to vex the Mexican Government, whose downfall he 
hoped personally to witness.^ Finally, the discontented minister, 
who had so often held out straws of hope to encourage his Govern- 
ment at Washington, pronounced Mexico a hopeless wreck ready for 
the wreckers, sent a caustic parting note to the new minister of foreign 
relations, and departed on October 20 for Vera Cruz, from whence he 
soon reached Mobile.- Summoned to Washington by the President, 
he resigned on February 7, to take effect on March 2, 1859. In May 
he published in the Washington Constitution extracts of his corre- 
spondence — justifying himself on grounds of self-defense against 
various newspaper attacks.^ In June, assuming undivided responsi- 
bility as editor of the Mobile Daily Register, and devoting himself to 
the work of "recovering rights in the Union lost by southern supine- 
ness — or, in default of that, of preparing the southern mind for that 
serious alternative which the South may be forced to adopt for self 
preservation," he said that his personal differences with President 
Buchanan would in no wise influence his course of duty to the Demo- 
cratic Party. "Let bygones be bygones." * 

Late in December, with a view to opening diplomatic relations 
with the Juarez Government in case it should prove able to adjust 
questions at issue between the two Republics, Buchanan sent to 
Mexico a special confidential agent, WiUiam M. Churcliill. Two 
months later he received from this agent a confidential report inclos- 
ing a memorandum signed by Juarez indicating a willingness to 
negotiate various treaties, including a cession of Lower California 
and perpetual rights of way across the isthmus of Tehuantepec and 
over other transit routes from the Rio Grande to Mazatlan and 
Guaymas, on the Gulf of California.^ Although the much-desired 
territories of Sonora and Chihuahua were not included in the basis 
for negotiations, the President decided to send a minister to Vera 
Cruz, 

On March 7, Robert M. McLane, of Maryland, was appointed 
envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary, with authority 
to recognize the Juarez Government and to offer $10,000,000 for 
the cession of Lower California and the grants of transit, $2,000,000 
of wliich was to be re tamed to pay the claims of American citizens 
against Mexico." His conclusion to recognize the constitutional 
Government was largely determined by "the very large interests 
already involved in the rights of way over Tehuantepec" and the 
American interests in Sonora which were threatened by a contest 

1 17 Instructions, Mexico, No. 49, July 15; 22 Despatches, Mexico, No. 88, Aug. 31, 1858. 

2 22 Daspatches, Mexico, No. 90, Sept. 18; Private, Oct. 1; No. 98, Nov. 22, 1858. 

3 Mobile Daily Register, May 18 and 24, 1859. 

4 Id., June 12, 1859. 

6 17 Instructions, Mexico, Dec. 27, 1858; 23 Despatches, Mexico, No. 1, Apr. 7; Secret and Special Service 
Despatches, vol. 1, p. 778, et seq. 
6 17 Instructions, Mexico, No. 2, Mar. 7, 1859. 



MEXICAN POLICY UNDER BUCHANAN. 143 

wdth the central Government in regard to its public domain in that 
State. ^ His negotiations were doubtless rendered more difficult by 
the protest of the central Government at Mexico City, wliich, 
although promptly notified that the American Government would 
maintain a neutral policy, declared that the United States had 
recognized the Juarez Government in order to despoil Mexico of 
her national territory, and proceeded to pronounce void all treaties 
and agreements between the two countries. ^ In the negotiations 
wliich followed, the cliief obstacle vv^as the proposition for the ces- 
sion of Lower California, which was especially opposed by Lerdo, 
the minister of finance, and which other members of the Juarez 
Government believed would be repudiated by the northern and 
central States of Mexico.^ Ocampo was "reluctant to engage liim- 
self to any actual cession of territory," but being held to liis implied 
obligation to give it if the United States desired* it, he avowed the 
readiness of Juarez to cede it."* Doubting, however, whether the 
congress which was to be elected in October could be induced to 
ratify such a provision, he proposed that it shoidd be placed in a 
separate treaty. In reply to the suggestion that there should be 
two separate treaties and a distinct division of the S10,000,000 
between territory and transits, President Buchanan adhered to the 
belief that both should be included in the same treaty, which he 
thought would be more likely to be ratified.-^ 

On the question of protection of transits the two countries could 
not agree. Ocampo declined to agree to the right of the United 
States to protect the transit across Tehuantepec, although he was 
inclined to be more liberal in regard to the concession of transit 
from Guaymas to Tucson by which McLane thought that the adja- 
cent State of Sonora was likely to be Americanized even before 
Arizona could be admitted as a State. He recognized the obligation 
of Mexico to protect the routes, but he agreed that, if Mexico should 
fail, the United States, with previous consent of the former, might 
employ armed forces, but should submit them to the laws and authori- 
ties of Mexico in all things not relating to the internal government 
of the troops, and should exercise no act of jurisdiction over the 
inhabitants or passengers except to suppress crime in the act of 
being committed. Cass could not accept this article unless it could 
be modified so as to make previous consent of Mexico necessary 
''except in cases of sudden emergency."^ 

1 23 Despatches, Mexico, No. 1, Apr.*7, 1859. 
» 23 Despatches, Mexico, No. 10, Apr. 30; No. 12, May 7, 1859. 
3 23 Despatches, Mexico, No. 20, June 22, 1859. 
* 23 Despatches, Mexico, No. 1, Apr. 7, 1859. 

^ 23 Despatches, Mexico, No. 5, Apr. 21; 17 Instructions, Mexico, No. 9, May 24, 18.59. 
8 23 Despatches, Mexico, No. 5, Apr. 21; No. 20, June 22; No. 23, July 10; 17 Instructions, Mexico, No. 
16, July 30, 1859. 



144 AMEEICAN HISTORICAL ASSOCIATTOIir. 

At the same time a combination of conditions and events — the 
pecuniary distress of the Juarez Government, the discontent in the 
party that supported it, the atrocities committed in territory over 
which it had no control, and the apprehension of European interven- 
tion at Vera Cruz — suggested the idea of an Americo-Mexican alHance 
wliich would give protection and order to Mexico and enable the 
United States to protect the lives and property of American citizens 
in Mexico, "by chastising any power there wliich should presume to 
violate sacred treaty obligations and the common law of humanity." ^ 
In June— a month after McLane recommended the immediate occu- 
pation of San Juan de Ulua by the United States (mth consent of 
the Juarez Government) to prevent its seizure by England or France — 
Ocampo submitted a project of a treaty of alliance providing for pro- 
tection and security to rights of way granted to citizens of the United 
States, and making it "obligatory on either of the two Repubhcs to 
aid in maintaining order and security in the territory of the other" 
upon request of a legitimate and acknowledged government obeyed 
by the majority of the nation and democratic in tendency. Tliis 
McLane declined to consider, basing his objections largely on tradi- 
tional grounds, wliich were approved by Secretary Cass.^ At the 
same time, although he was opposed both to Lerdo's proposed guar- 
antee of territorial integrity ^ and Ocampo's more general proposition 
for the support of republican institutions, he always agreed that, 
after a satisfactory treaty relating to transits and the cession of 
Lower Cahfornia, the United States could be expected to enter into 
some arrangement wliich would give steadiness and security to the 
mutual interests thus established, and wliich "could be extended 
with propriety to the maintenance of law and order in the entire Re- 
public." Although he could not agree to obligate the United States 
by treaty to intervene at the call of the Mexican Government, he sug- 
gested to Cass that an article authorizing the United States to exert 
its mihtary power to enforce the stipulations embraced in the general 
treaty, and to chastise and punish if necessary, would secure the as- 
cendency of American influence and American commerce in Mexico 
and establish a government of constitutional freedom there.* 

The administration was finally forced to abandon its instructions 
for negotiations on a basis of acquisition of territory. From the be- 
ginning McLane confessed that he saw the impracticabihty of nego- 
tiating for the acquisition of Lower Cahfornia unless the ratification 
and the purchase money could be promptly secured, enabhng the 

1 23 Despatches, Mexico, No. 8, Apr. 2; No. 12, May 7, 1859. 

* 17 Insrructions, Mexico, p. 242, No. 14, JiHy 8. 

s McLane said that Lerdo, who was much opposed to the cession of territory unless at an exorbitant 
compensation and at a future day, and who had differences with the cabinet on domestic questions which 
threatened the dissolution of the Government, introduced this proposition because he was unwilling to 
agree to any arrangement at the time. 23 Despatches, Mexico, No. 23, July 10, 1859. 

4 23 Despatches, Mexico, No. 23, July 10; No. 22, July 10, 1859. 



MEXICAN" POLICY UNDEE BITCH AN AIST. 145 

Government to distribute a share of the money to the States wliicii 
sustained the treaty. At one critical time he encouraged liis Gov- 
ernment by the announcement that Lerdo, who in the cabinet had 
strenuously opposed any cession except at the exorbitant price of 
$30,000,000, had unexpectedly modified liis views enough to favor a 
reconsideration on the basis of 815,000,000; but witli little hope of suc- 
cess he suggested that his Government should thereafter leave the ter- 
ritorial question to liis discretion.^ At least, he thought that the 
proposed maximum price should be increased from $10,000,000 to 
$12,000,000. Doubting the ^\'isdom of negotiating for a transfer of 
territory at a time when two opposing Governments were in conflict 
for possession of the empire, he hoped President Buchanan would au- 
thorize him to sign a treaty without reference to Lower Cahfornia, 
and to pay $2,000,000 or $3,000,000 in consideration of the other 
stipulations.^ TVliile the President was extremely un^\^lling to sanc- 
tion any convention in which the cession was not embraced, he 
finally authorized as a last resort the acceptance of transits and other 
rights at a stipulated payment of $4,000,000, of which the sum of 
$2,000,000 was to be reserved for the claims of American citizens.^ 

In the later negotiations conducted \\^th Fuente, the new minister 
of relations, who adhered closely to the defense of Ocampo's project, 
McLane was unable to overcome the objections to the discretionary 
power of military force by the United States for the protection of 
the transits. The Juarez Government, urging that it must maintain 
its sovereignty over the transit routes, proposed for the protection 
of the transits an agreement to keep a fixed miUtary force in com- 
mission which would obviate the possible contingency of any sudden 
emergency wliich might render necessary the military force of the 
United States without previous consent of Mexico. There was still 
another obstacle which had already been suggested by both Ocampo 
and Lerdo. Fuente urged the necessity of an immediate payment of 
the pecuniary consideration and declared that his Government, unless 
it could receive money at once to increase its power, could neither 
make the concession relating to Lower California nor that relating 
to the discretionary power of the United States to protect the tran- 
sits \N-ithout danger of exciting an opposition which would lead to 

1 23 Despatches, Mexico, No. 23, July 10; No. 26, July 12. Lerdo went to the United States at this 
time on a mission to raise money on confiscated church property. " If he should succeed, " wrote McLane, 
"there is no probability of acquiring Lower California. If he fail, I think he wiU advocate the cession." 
23 Despatches, Mexico, No. 26, July 12. Two months later Consul Black wrote McLane that it was 
currently reported that Lerdo had completely succeeded in his negotiations at Washington and that 
Sonora and Lower California had been sold to the United States for $30,000,000. The report, however, 
•was incorrect. 24 Despatches, Mexico, No. 38, Sept. 24. Lerdo failed to negotiate a loan. 24 Despatches, 
Mexico, No. 49, Nov. 6, 1S59. 

2 23 Despatches, Mexico, UnoSacial, June 25, 1859. 

3 17 Instructions, Mexico, No. 10, July 30, 1859. 

98181°— 12 10 



146 AMEKICAN HISTORICAL ASSOCIATION. 

the overthrow of the Government before ratifications could be 
exchanged.^ 

After closing negotiations McLane suggested that the weak 
Juarez Government, which still adhered to Ocampo's project of alli- 
ance, might be induced to accept a matured proposition from the 
United States .^ In an unofficial dispatch of October 31 he pro- 
posed to sustain the weak Juarez Government by some sort of a 
mihtary alliance which his Government regarded as a wide depar- 
ture from previous American policy and disapproved because it was 
intended, not for a temporary emergency, but as a part of a general 
treaty, and also because it endangered the acceptance of any treaty 
with which it might be connected.^ Two months earlier he recom- 
mended that the President should "ask Congress the power to enter 
Mexico with the military forces of the United States, at the call of its 
authorities, in order to protect the citizens and treaty rights of the 
United States."* This the President proceeded to do in his annual 
message of December, 1859. He considered this a wise precaution to 
prevent the future necessity of interference for the maintenance of the 
established American pohcy against intervention of European 
nations in American political affairs. 

Keturning to Vera Cruz in November, after a vacation of two 
months, McLane found the conditions more favorable for negotiating 
a treaty of transits and of commerce and intervention.^ Unable 
to secure the loan which Lerdo had been sent to negotiate in the 
United States, and too weak to maintain order and enforce treaty 
stipulations, the Juarez Government accepted the only alternative — 
to conclude the negotiations for a treaty on the basis of McLane's 
later instructions. Fuente, again refusing to accept any modifica- 
tions of Ocampo's project, promptly retired from the Government. 
Ocampo, who resumed the post of minister of relations, was assured 
by McLane that he had no desire to press the views of his Govern- 
ment nor to resume negotiations except on the American basis pre- 
viously proposed. He promptly and fully conceded the views of 
President Buchanan in regard to the protection of transits and agreed 
to modify other articles to suit the views of the American Govern- 
ment. The most difficult task was to induce the constitutional Gov- 
ernment to recognize its obligation to seek the aid of the United 
States whenever it should be unable effectually to perform its proper 
functions as a government in the enforcement of treaty stipulations 
and the maintenance of order. This was finally accomplished by 
emphasizing the fact that sooner or later the United States would 

1 24 Despatches, Mexico, No. 30, Aug. 27; No. 33, Aug. 31, 1859. 

2 24 Despatches, Mexico, No. 31, Aug. 28. 

8 24 Despatches, Mexico, Unofficial, Oct. 31; 17 Instructions, Mexico, No. 21, Nov. 4, 1859. 
* 24 Despatches, Mexico, No. 31, Aug. 28, 1859. 
»24 Despatches, Mexico, No. 56, Dec. 9, 1859. 



MEXICAN POLICY UNDER BUCHANAN. 147 

act without reference to the constitutional Government or any other 
government or authority in defense of treaty rights and to protect its 
citizens. Wliile emphasizing the fixed poHcy of his Government to 
avoid all interference in the domestic administration of Mexico, McLane 
''insisted that it was the recognized duty of the United States to 
interfere when its own security, or what is due itself in the abstract 
or in virtue of treaty stipulations, rec|uired such intervention."^ 

The resumption of negotiations promptly resulted in a treaty of 
transits and commerce, conceding valuable privileges for which the 
United States agreed to pay $4,000,000. Of this amount, $2,000,000 
were payable on the exchange of ratifications and $2,000,000 were 
to be retained by the United States for the payment of claims of 
American citizens against Mexico, The privileges included the 
rights of way under the sovereignty of ^Mexico across the Isthmus of 
Tehuantepec, and also from the lower Rio Grande via Monterey to 
Mazatlan and from Rancho de Nogales to Guaymas by any kind of 
road, together with a port of deposit at each terminus of the route 
and free and unrestricted passage of merchandise and of mail in 
closed bags across Tehuantepec. The United States also was given 
the right to transport troops, military stores, and munitions of war 
over the Isthmus of Tehuantepec and from Guaymas to some suitable 
place on the boundary in the vicinity of Rancho de Nogales. 

The treat}^ provided that both the United States and Mexico 
should protect the transits and guarantee their neutrality. It stipu- 
lated that Mexico should use her military forces if necessary to protect 
persons and property passing over any of the routes; but that, upon 
her failure to act, the American Government, with the request and 
consent of the Mexican Government, or of the Mexican minister at 
Washmgton, or of the competent and legally appointed local authori- 
ties, might employ military force for the same purpose (but for no 
other). In case of imminent danger to the lives and property of 
American citizens the American Government was authorized to act 
with mihtary force for their protection without obtaining previous 
consent of Mexico. 

Remarkable convention articles to enforce treaty stipulations 
departed radically from the traditional policy of the United States m 
their provision for direct intervention under certain conditions. The 
provisions of Article 1 were as follows: "If any of the stipulations of 
existing treaties between Mexico and the United States are violated, 
or the safety and security of the citizens of either Republic are endan- 
gered within the territory of the other, and the legitimate and acknowl- 
edged Government thereof may be unable from any cause to enforce 
such stipulations or to provide for such safety and security, it shall 
be obligatory on that Government to seek the aid of the other in 

1 24 Despatches, Mexico, No. 57, Dec. 15, 1859. 



148 AMERICAN HISTORICAL ASSOCIATION. 

maintaining their due execution, as well as order and security, in the 
territory of that Repubhc where such violation and discord occur; 
and in every such special case the expense shall be paid by the treasury 
of the nation within w^hose territory such intervention may become 
necessary; and if discord shall occur on the frontier of the two Kepub- 
lics the authorities of the two Repubhcs nearest the place where the 
disorder exists shall act in concert and cooperation for the arrest and 
punishment of criminals who have disturbed the pubUc order and 
security of either Repubhc, and for this purpose the parties guilty 
of these offenses may be arrested within either EepubHc and dehvered 
over to the authorities of that Repubhc within which the crime 
may have been committed; the nature and character of such inter- 
vention, as well as the expense thereof, and the manner of arresting 
and subjecting to punishment the said criminals, shall be determined 
and regulated by an agreement between the executive branches of 
the two Governments." 

The extraordinary nature of the convention was recognized, and it 
was justified only as a measure which might prevent serious inter- 
national compUcations. Consul Black, hoping it would "turn out 
best in the end," wrote: "Our country has a solemn duty to per- 
form — to itself, to the world, to the cause of humanity and to that 
of freedom and human rights — from which it will never shirk. "^ The 
convention was regarded as the only hope left to the constitutional 
Government. In urging the ratification by the Senate, ]\lcLane said 
that if the United States should decUne the responsibiUty of the 
convention, the continuation of anarchy in Mexico would result in 
direct intervention from some quarter and perhaps expose the United 
States to the "responsibility of a general war and a conquest that 
few would desire to undertake or consummate."^ If the President 
could secure ratification and authority to use the naval and military 
power of the Government in the Gulf and the Pacific to establish the 
constitutional Government in Mexico and enforce treaty stipula- 
tions, he expected the prompt submission of the Miramon Govern- 
ment, which in spite of his assurance of continued neutrahty had 
pubhshed a vigorous and offensive protest.^ "When it is ratified," 
said he, "I can easily dictate terms to the Mramon Government, 
obtain redress, and pacify this country. If it is rejected, anarchy 
will be the order of the day, and American influence will cease here."'' 
A month later, desiring to anticipate any possible action of jMiramon 
which might embarrass the situation, he urgently requested au- 
thority to adopt a decisive policy and to act as though the treaties 
had already been ratified. "Let us take the constitutional Govern- 

1 24 Despatches, Mexico, Dee. 9; and No. C5, Dec. 30, 1859. 

* 24 Despatches, Mexico, No. 57, Dec. 15, 1859. 
3 24 Despatches, Mexico, No. 63, Dec. 22, 1859. 

• 25 Despatches, Mexico, No. 66, Jan. 7, 1860. 



MEXICAN POLICY UNDER BUCHANAN. 149 

ment firmly by the hand," said he.^ On March 30, impatient with the 
slowness at Washington and apprehensive of European intervention, 
he advised withdrawal from all active responsibility and diplomatic 
intercourse with ^lexico in case Congress should fail to sustain the 
Mexican policy of the administration.- The President, deferring all 
consideration of withdrawal, was as much disappointed as McLane 
with the failure of the Senate to approve the treaty and the refusal 
of Congress to give him power to use mihtary force in jMexico, by 
which he said "European Governments would have been deprived of 
all pretext to interfere in the territorial and domestic concerns" of 
that country and the United States relieved from the obligation 
of resisting European attempts to deprive a neighboring Republic 
of portions of her territory.^ 

Near the close of the summer, in a conference with Cass at Wash- 
ington, McLane requested authority to make to the European ministers 
in Mexico some reliable statement of policy which would limit their 
operations in Mexico and at the same time encourage the Juarez 
Government and increase the influence of the United States there. 
Embarrassed by the effect which the failure of the treatj^" might have 
on his subsequent influence in Mexico, at a time when England, 
France, and Spain had given notice of their determination to inter- 
vene to restore peace and enforce demands for redress, he suggested 
that he should confer with the English, French, and Spanish minis- 
ters at his o^vn discretion and opportunity in order to advise them 
that he would use his best offices to facilitate all eft'orts for the restora- 
tion of peace on a fundamental basis of the right of the people of 
Mexico to establish and regulate their own Government and political 
destiny, and that the enforcement of demands for redress of wrongs 
subject to international reparation must not be exercised capri- 
eioush^ as a pretext to change and control the political destiny and 
institutions of the country.* Secretary Cass, although he saw no 
necessit}^ for a formal declaration of policy, asserted that any Euro- 
pean attempt to extort assent to a new government in jSIexico and 
establish European ascendency would be met by the United States 
with armed action — in case Congress should adhere to the policy so 
long avowed and publicly proclaimed. Assuring McLane that tliere 
would be no abandonment of watchfulness of American interests in 
IMexico, he directed hmi to return to Vera Cruz without delay, to 
establish friendly relations with the Juarez Government, to ascer- 
tain the objects contemplated by the foreign powers, to give them to 

1 25 Despatches, Mexico, Private and Confidential, Jan. 21; and No. 68, Jan. 21, ISOO. The treaty was 
submitted to the Senate on Jan. 4, and through some leak it appeared in the National Intelligencer of 
Feb. 18, 18C0. 

- 25 Despatches, Mexico, No. 72, Mar. 30. 

3 17 Instructions, Mexico, No. 32, Apr. 2S, 1860. 

* 26 Despatches, Mexico, Sept. 1, 1860 



150 AMEEICAN HISTORICAL ASSOCIATION. 

understand that the United States would adhere firmly to its policy 
against foreign intervention, and to be guided by circumstances as 
they should occur.^ In the following November McLane reported 
that the Spanish minister had confirmed previous disavowals of any 
desire or intention to hold possession of any part of the country or 
to control its destinies. At the same time stating that President 
Juarez had steadily resisted all suggestions for signing a supplemen- 
tal article for extending the time for exchanging ratifications of the 
treaty, he resigned and recommended the withdrawal of the mission. 
The President accepted his resignation and approved his course, but 
continued the mission by the appointment of a successor in the 
person of John B. Weller, of California.- Before his return, declining 
an invitation to cooperate with the European powers in favor of 
mediation, McLane sent I^Ir. La Reintrie as a special agent on a mis- 
sion to the interior to deny the allegations that the United States 
desired a continuance of the Civil War, and to declare both to the 
Liberals and to foreign representatives the policy of the United 
States in regard to foreign intervention. In his special communica- 
tion to the ministers of all foreign powers in Mexico, sent from San 
Angel (near Mexico City) on December 20, a week before the capture 
of the capital by the forces of Juarez, La Reintrie made a statement 
of American policy in which he declared that in case the European 
powers should interfere with the political independence of the Re- 
public of Mexico, the United States would "to the extent of its 
power defend the nationality and independence of said Republic" — 
a declaration to which Seward was umvilling to commit his Govern- 
ment eight months later,^ 

In the meantime events in the United States rendered improbable 
any reconsideration of the McLane treaty by the Senate. The seces- 
sion of South Carolina started a movement winch turned public 
attention to new questions and soon took from the Senate almost all 
the members who had voted for the treaty. 

The sequel to the story of persistent negotiations which terminated 
in an unratified treaty may be found in the Confederate policy to 
form an alliance with Mexico or to absorb it, the French policy of 
intervention in Mexico, and the American poHcy under vSeward to 
prevent the execution of both Confederate and French poHcies and to 
preserve the integrity and independence of Mexico. A month after 
the formation of the Confederate government at Montgomery, Zarco, 
the Mexican minister of relations, complamed to Weller that there 
were reasons to suspect that parties were leaving the United States 
with a purpose of invading either Lower California or Sonora. The 

» 17 Instructions, Mexico, pp. 306-338, Sept.' 20, ISGO. 

s 26 Despatches, Mexico, Nos. 104 of Nov. 5, and 106 of Nov. 12; 17 Instructions, Mexico, No. -12, Nov. 20, 
1860. 
3 26 Despatches, Mexico, No. 113, Dec. 21, 1800; House Exec. Doc. 100, 37th Cong., 2d sess., Apr. 14, 1862. 



MEXICAN POLICY UNDER BUCHANAN. 151 

Mexican minister at Washington also complained of the designs of 
southern filibusters and slavery propagandists.^ The earlier Mexican 
policy of the Confederate government is seen in the instructions given 
to Pickett to sound the Government of Juarez on the subject of 
alhance, m the filibustering spirit of Pickett's dispatches, and in the 
mission of Qumtero to the governor of the northern Provinces, which 
were in a state of revolution. Seward, in his instructions to Corwdn, 
as minister to Mexico, declared (Apr. 6) that the new administration 
had no sympathy with, the schemes or designs recently conceived by 
the southern secessionists to establish a protectorate or other control 
over part or all of Mexico, and would take proper care to preserve 
neutrality and to prevent any apprehended attempts at invasion of 
Mexican territory.- Although he was opposed to the dismemberment 
of Mexico, he would have been willing to pay a good price for Lower 
California in order to prevent the Confederates from obtaining it as a 
base for extending their conquests.^ Seeing that European powers, 
taking advantage of the efforts of the secessionists to divide the 
United States, and the inability of Mexico to reorganize herself and 
pay her debts, might increase American responsibilities by attempt- 
ing their long threatened intervention in Mexico, Seward doubtless 
would have been ^^^iling (as a preventive measure) to assume the 
payment of the interest due foreigners on the Mexican funded debt — 
takmg as security a mortgage or pledge upon the public lands of 
Lower California, Chihuahua, Sonora, and Sinaloa ; but many Sena- 
tors, fearing it might result in annexation, opposed a loan on pledge of 
territory.* 

1 27 Despatches, Mexico, No. 3, Mar. 18, 1861; Department of State, etc.. Notes to Department from 
Mexican Legation, vol. 9, Apr. 1 and May 4, 1861. 

2 17 Instructions, Mexico, No. 2, Apr. 6. 

3 17 Instructions, Mexico, No. 8; 27 Despatches, Mexico, Nos. 1, 2, and 3 of May 29, June 29, and July 
29,1861. 

« 17 Instructions, Mexico, No. 2; 27 Despatches, Mexico, Nos. 4, 5, and 6 of Aug. and Sep., et seq; 17 
Instructions, Mexico, Nos. 49 and 50 of June 7 and 24, 1861. 



ft 



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